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Faces of security. Radicalization of prisoners as a challenge for the future of security of the Polish penitentiary institutions

Abstract: An issue that is essential to contemporary society is the question of state security and personal safety of the citizens. Therefore, the state has to deal with one of the most important threats, i.e. radicalization. The phenomenon of home-grown radicalism is known in Western European countries. The phenomenon of radicalization should not be identified solely with contemporary domestic Islamic terrorism. Radicalism is not limited to one ideology. The question about the process of acquiring extremist beliefs is one of the most important for political scientists, political psychologists, sociologists and criminologists. Wanting to deal with the etiology of the decision about a terrorist attack, the focus should be on the moment when potential terrorists start and undergo the process of radicalization. The article aims to signal the problem of radicalization in Polish penitentiary units. The authors do not provide the knowledge necessary to counteract this phenomenon in penitentiary units. However, they point to the definition problems, the theoretical model of radicalization, the place of radicalization in the European Union's policy. They also present the penitentiary unit as a place susceptible to radicalization. They formulate general remarks on combating radicalization among prisoners. They inform that the Prison Service should not be left alone in counteracting the radicalization of prisoners. It is an element of the state security system. It also cooperates with other entities in the rehabilitation of prisoners. The authors acknowledge that the way to prevent the negative effects of the radicalization process of prisoners is first of all training personnel in this field. It is also the fundamental issue to isolate prisoners who are a source of danger. In this area, the authors suggest that if the radical attitudes

of prisoners are intensified, it is worth considering introducing legislative solutions facilitating faster and adequate operation of prison staff in such cases.

Key words: Security, personal safety, radicalization, prison staff, prison's security, terrorism.

Introduction

The phenomenon of homely radicalism is known in the countries of Western Europe. Ivo Veenkamp pointed out at the end of 2004 that the Dutch society had realized the possibility of creating new terrorists as a result. At the time, a Moroccan, raised in Amsterdam and regarded as a fully integrated person, killed the film director Theo van Gogh. The killer turned out to be a member of the Dutch jihadists who were under the influence of the Syrian salafist. The expert also recommends that in analyzing and counteracting terrorism and radicalism, treat the phenomenon independently. He also recalls the obvious: no one is born a terrorist. To kill, one has to radicalize¹. At the outset, terrorism should be carefully defined. Radicalism is not limited to one ideology² – Islamic terrorism. As Robert Borkowski remarks, a question about the process of acquiring extremist convictions is one of the most important issues for political scientists, psychologists of politics, sociologists and criminologists³. Combating radicalism is essential to counteract the creation of new terrorist networks⁴. As it has been described by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, in order to deal with the etiology of the decision on a terrorist attack, one should concentrate on the moment when potential terrorists start and undergo a process of radicalization⁵.

The study aims to signal the problem of radicalization in Polish penitentiary units. The authors do not provide the knowledge necessary to counteract this phenomenon in penitentiary units. However, they point to a definitional context, a theoretical model of radicalization, a place of radicalization in the European Union's policy. They also present the penitentiary unit as a place susceptible to radicalization. They formulate general remarks on combating radicalization among

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¹ I. Veenkamp, Terrorism prevention – Coordination of actions as the basis of effectiveness in fighting terrorism, [in:] M. Adamczuk, K. Rypulak-Mirowska, Counteracting terrorism. Coordination of anti-terrorism actions. Conference materials [Przeciwdziałanie terroryzmowi. Koordynacja działań antyterrorystycznych. Materiały z konferencji], https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/terroryzm_publik08.pdf, p. 16 (downloaded: 2019-01-07).

² A. P. Schmid, Research on Radicalisation: Topics and Themes, [in:] „Perspectives on terrorism” 2016, no. 3, p. 27.

³ R. Borkowski, Radicalization as an analytical category in the profiling of terrorists. Security: theory and practice [Radykalizacja jako kategoria analityczna w profilowaniu terrorystów. Bezpieczeństwo: teoria i praktyka], [in:] Czasopismo Krakowskiej Szkoły Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego 8/4, 73-81, Krakow 2014, p. 73.

⁴ I. Veenkamp, op.cit., p. 19.

⁵ M.D. Silber, A. Bhatt, Radicalization in the west: the homegrown threat, New York 2007, p. 5;

prisoners. They inform that the Prison Service should not be left alone in counteracting the radicalization of prisoners. It is an element of the state security system. It also cooperates with other entities in the social rehabilitation of prisoners. In this context, the authors propose their own definition of the term “security of prisoners in penitentiary units”.

The authors acknowledge that the way to prevent the negative effects of the radicalization process of prisoners is first of all training personnel in this field. It is also fundamental to isolate prisoners who constitute a source of danger. In this area, the authors suggest that if radical attitudes in prison are intensified, it is worth considering introducing legislative solutions to facilitate quicker and more adequate operation of prison staff in such cases, which will undoubtedly have an impact on the level of security in a holistic approach.

Radicalization – definitional problems

Radicalization of views is one of the chief security problems of contemporary Europe. It is of interest to decisive groups and entities whose operations are related to security. However, there is no compliance in the international arena regarding the common definition of the term⁶. Below are some selected definitions to show that individual authors emphasize various factors in them.

American scholars from the University of Pennsylvania John Horgan and Kurt Braddock concisely define radicalization as “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology”⁷.

In the study of the NYPD Intelligence Division & Counter-Terrorism Bureau on Islamic extremism, radicalization was defined as “the process of internalizing the extremist system of views and thus adopting an extremist religious-political ideology that legitimizes terrorism as a means of social change. Terrorism is the final stage of the radicalization process”⁸.

Dutch scientists Froukje Demant, Marieke Sloodman, Frank Buijs and Jean Tillie define radicalization as “a process of de-legitimation, a process in which confidence in the system decreases and the individual retreats further and further into his or her own group, because he or she no longer feels part of society”⁹.

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⁶ A. P. Schmid, op.cit., s. 27.

⁷ J. Horgan, K. Braddock, ‘Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalisation Programs’, ‘Terrorism and Political Violence’, Vol. 22 (2010), p. 279.

⁸ R.Borkowski, op.cit., s. 78., M.D. Silber, A. Bhatt, Radicalization in the west: the homegrown threat, New York 2007.

⁹ F. Demant, M. Sloodman, F. Buijs, J.Tillie, Decline, Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes of De-radicalisation, Amsterdam, p. 12.

British researchers Akil N. Awan, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin pay attention to the role of the media, because they recognize that radicalization is a "a phenomenon that has emerged in the early twenty-first century because the new media ecology enables patterns of connectivity that can be harnessed by individuals and groups for practices of persuasion, organisation and the enactment of violence. The very possibility of this happening but uncertainty about how it happens created a conceptual vacuum which 'radicalisation' filled"¹⁰.

An expert in the field of security sciences, currently working for the British Exeter University, Omar Ashour, states that "radicalisation is a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilisation of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals"¹¹.

Polish scientists Aleksander Zięba and Damian Szlachter describe radicalism as socialization for extremism manifested in the negation of the existing system / political order through the use or threat of the use of political violence (terrorism)¹².

For the purposes of this study, however, the understanding of radicalization is assumed in accordance with the relatively broad definition, which was formulated by Alex P. Schmid. Born in Switzerland, the Dutch scholar captures radicalization as "an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside

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¹⁰ A.N. Awan, A. Hoskins, B. Loughlin, *Radicalisation and Media: Connectivity and Terrorism in the New Media Ecology* London, p. 125.

¹¹ O. Ashour, *The De-Radicalisation of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements*, London, 2009, p. 5.

¹² A. Zięba, D. Szlachter, *Combating terrorism – fighting radicalization and recruitment of terrorists within the European Union. A case study of Muslim communities [Zwalczanie terroryzmu – walka z radykalizacją postaw i werbowaniem terrorystów na obszarze Unii Europejskiej. Studium przypadku społeczności muzułmańskich]*, [in:] W. Fehler, K. Marczuk, *European Union policy in the field of internal security. Conditions – implementation – challenges in the second decade of the 21st century [Polityka Unii Europejskiej w zakresie bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego. Uwarunkowania – realizacja – wyzwania w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku]*, Warsaw 2015, pp. 145-146.

the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate”¹³.

The proces of radicalization

A similar problem, as in the case of the definition of the concept itself, occurs when trying to determine the individual stages of radicalization. There are many models of this process. Below, there are three basic ones, which, according to the authors, adequately represent radicalization as a process. The author of one of the first was American professor Randy Borum. He formulated the following four steps of radicalization:

- Recognition by the pre-radicalised individual or group that an event or condition is wrong (‘it’s not right’);
- A framing of the event or condition as selectively unjust (‘it’s not fair’);
- Others are held responsible for the perceived injustice (‘it’s your fault’);
- The demonization of the ‘other’ (‘you’re evil’)¹⁴.

As Alex Schmid points out, the influential model of the radicalization process was created by Quintan Wiktorowicz. The final element of the process is the entrance of a person into group structures. The scheme consists of four basic stages:

- cognitive opening,
- religious seeking,
- frame alignment,
- socialization¹⁵.

It seems that an important term from the point of view of security; security of penitentiary units: “cognitive opening” is introduced by Quintan Wiktorowicz. The author describes them succinctly as “the opening of the individual to new ideas and world views”¹⁶. “Cognitive opening” is the moment when a person who tried to understand the meaning of his existence suddenly saw the light and at the same time rejected the old views of the world in favor of the new truth¹⁷. A prerequisite for joining a radical religious group is the willingness of the individual to open himself to the message of the given ideological movement. Prior socialization experiences have a significant impact on the recognition of the gro-

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¹³ A. Schmid, *Radicalization, De-Radicalization, Counter-Radicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*, ICCT Research Paper 2013, p. 19.

¹⁴ A. Schmid, *op.cit.*, s. 24.; R. Borum, *Understanding the terrorist mindset*, [in:] *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 72 (7), 2003, pp. 7-10.

¹⁵ Q. Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam”, [in:] *Paper presented at “The Roots of Islamic Radicalism” Conference, Yale University, 2004*, p. 1.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

¹⁷ Schmid, A. *op.cit.*, p. 24; Q. Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, Lanham, 2005.

up's views as true and thus on the probability of conscious exposure. Most units will consider the ideological movement as irrational or extreme and will reject its offer.

However, the crisis in which some individuals are can cause "cognitive opening", which shakes certainty about previous beliefs and makes the person more open to alternative views. The reasons for interest in extremist movements cannot, therefore, be limited to economic, social, cultural or political aspects. For personal qualities based on specific experiences of the individual, such as death in the family, victimization or family conflicts, can cause "cognitive opening".

Individual movements can support the "cognitive opening" of the individual through their own activity. Activists have different tools. They can use, for example, social networks or initiate new friendships. The goal is to initiate a sense of crisis in the individual through conversations or subtle interactions. Activists initiate harmless discussions about Islam with those gathered in the mosque. They strive to establish new relationships and try to instill in the individual the need to deal with an urgent matter. Islamists, like Mormons, conceal their identity and belonging to the group, until they develop relationships with the individual and gain trust. Therefore, in order to recruit, the movements use not only existing social bonds, but also invest in creating new relationships and networks of unrelated persons. Of course, "cognitive opening" can also be the effect of experiencing a "moral shock", as a result of getting acquainted with information placed in brochures or in photographs or, for example, preached during demonstrations¹⁸.

Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt in their reflections on the determinants of the Islamic extremism point at the following phases of the radicalization process:

- pre-radicalization,
- self-identification,
- indoctrination,
- jihadization¹⁹.

Each phase is unique and has its own characteristics. Not every person goes through all phases. Many people stop at one of the phases, or completely interrupt the process of radicalization. Phase sequence is indicated, but not in each case they occur one after the other. The authors indicate that there is a high probability that the person who will go through the phases will get involved in the implementation of terrorist acts²⁰.

Pre-radicalization is the starting point. It is a period in the life of the individual before surrendering to the influences and acceptance of ideology as one's own. The authors of the theory say that the majority of individuals were living a normal life and had little in common with criminal activity.

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¹⁸ Q. Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause...", op.cit., pp. 7-8.

¹⁹ M.D. Silber, A. Bhatt, op.cit., p. 6;

²⁰ Ibidem, ps. 6;

Individuals entering the second phase of *self-identification*, explore the ideologies under the influence of internal and external factors. Over time, they move away from their current identity, identify with people with similar views, and finally accept the new ideology as their own. The catalyst for these religious searches is cognitive opening, or a crisis shaking up the existing beliefs, thus creating space for absorbing new worldviews.

There are many types of factors that can serve as a catalyst, including: economic (job loss, lack of mobility), social (isolation, discrimination, experiencing or observing racism), political (international conflicts with the participation of Muslims) and personal (death in the immediate family). Self-identification can be a phase lived individually. In the next stage, however, relations with people who think similarly take on meaning.

Indoctrination is a phase in which the individual gradually strengthens his beliefs and fully accepts ideology. It also comes to the conclusion that there are undoubtedly circumstances where action is necessary. This action is militant jihad. "Spiritual sanctioner" plays a supporting role in this phase. In the indoctrination phase, the group chosen by the individual becomes more and more important, as the radical views do.

Jihadization is the phase in which members of the group accept their individual duty to participate in jihad. They describe themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Eventually, the group will be ready to plan a terrorist act. Activities include planning, preparation and implementation. The first three phases of radicalization can take up to two or three years, the last stage may turn out to be a very fast process, because it can last only a few months or weeks²¹.

The European Union facing the problem of inmates' radicalization

European Union bodies are undertaking a series of actions to prevent terrorism. The article indicates selected elements of these activities. The EU's 2005 strategy in the field of fighting against terrorism is based on prevention, protection, prosecution and response. The first section requires: "to prevent people turning to terrorism, eliminating factors or primary causes that can lead to radicalization and recruitment of candidates, in Europe and internationally"²². One of the most important priorities of the first section is the elimination of the problem of incitement and recruitment in a prison environment recognized as the key environment²³, i.e. counteracting radicalization. The issue of preventing radicali-

²¹ D. Silber, A. Bhatt, op.cit., pp. 6-7.

²² European Council, EU strategy in the field of counter-terrorism, 2005-11-30, p. 3.

²³ Ibidem, 2005, p. 9.

zation in penitentiary units was also included in the European Union Strategy in the fight against radicalization and recruitment of terrorists. In 2014, the draft of the strategy already revised²⁴ clearly indicates that in many sectors there are possibilities to prevent the spread of radicalism. An important element of any effective anti-radicalization program was the training of staff, including penitentiary units.

It has been stated that it is possible to recognize radicalization at an early stage, however knowledge of these symptoms and their understanding is required²⁵. The European Council is committed to supporting programs aimed at raising the level of awareness of radicalization and recruitment as well as training programs, which are to be addressed to practitioners. It also pointed to the need to enable the exchange of experience between experts from individual Member States. At the same time, the European Council considered it appropriate to learn from the experience of practitioners, including knowledge at the disposal of such entities as RAN and CEPOL²⁶.

In 2015, the European Parliament issued a resolution, in which it emphasizes the importance of staff training. It indicates that it is necessary to conduct specialized training not only for the staff of penitentiary units, but also for specific cooperating entities²⁷. The resolution also indicates the value of trainings for the clergymen working in penitentiary units, as well as the appropriate selection of these people. In this context, such people would not only provide religious services, but also contribute to combating potentially radical views²⁸. The European Parliament urges involving inmates in programs that promote critical thinking, religious tolerance and social reintegration, as well as the impact on, in particular, young prisoners who are susceptible to radicalization or recruitment by activists. At the same time, it indicates that supporting measures should be addressed to these people when leaving the penitentiary unit²⁹.

In 2017 guidelines were formulated for the EU strategy to combat radicalization and recruitment of terrorists, where the need for further cooperation in the exchange of knowledge in the field of good practices and the training of first-line personnel was clearly indicated. In particular, the need for cooperation between the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), EuroPris and the European Penitentiary Training Academies (EPTA) and the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) was identified³⁰.

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²⁴ Point 34 European Council, The draft of the revised EU strategy in the fight against radicalization and recruitment of terrorists, 2014-05-19.

²⁵ Ibidem, point 24

²⁶ Ibidem, point 35.

²⁷ Point 12, European Parliament Resolution on 2015-11-25 on the prevention of radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations (2015/2063(INI)) (2017/C 366/08)

²⁸ Ibidem, point 12

²⁹ Ibidem, point 13.

³⁰ European Council, Appendix III to The draft of the revised guidelines for the EU strategy to combat radicalization and recruitment of terrorists, Brussels, 2017-05-24.

In 2017, the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R)³¹ was established, which includes, among others, representatives of the Center of Excellence as part of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). In 2018, the HLCEG-R Commission published a report in which it formulated a number of recommendations and challenges regarding radicalization in prisons. Priority areas are cooperation between Member States in the scope of: organization of joint training, exchange of experience, research results and training materials, development of risk assessment tools, creation of programs to disconnect a person from a radical group and reintegration into society, development of religious counseling, creation of alternative forms of imprisonment (especially for women and young people)³².

The Commission suggests that Member States should pay particular attention to the practical training of prison staff (for example via e-learning), as well as to allow representatives to participate in training organized by European organizations (e.g. CEPOL). It is also desirable that all countries join the European Penitentiary Training Academies (EPTA) network, which can become a forum for sharing, evaluating and developing existing practices. It is appropriate for the Commission to create a repository accessible to interested parties for textbooks containing knowledge about the radicalization of prisoners³³.

A penitentiary unit as vulnerable ground for inmates' radicalization

Dangerous ideologies can be preached in various places. Starting from the "official" mosque in which a radical spiritual leader was found, through informal gatherings, to secret meetings taking place in virtual space, but also in schools or in prisons³⁴. Often a "incubator of radicalization" may also be a non-governmental organization, as well as a dormitory, a café, a bar, a bookshop or a butcher's shop or a taxi stand³⁵. The phenomenon of radicalization in penitentiary units is not new. Penitentiary institutions create a fertile ground for the expansion of attitudes and behaviors that may be defined as extreme.

As Mark Hamm points out, radicalization in prisons can cause both positive and negative results. The latter may in extreme cases lead to terrorism or geno-

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³¹ European Commission Decision on 2017-07-27 establishing a High Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalization (2017/C 252/04).

³² High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R) Final Report 18 May 2018, p. 5.

³³ Ibidem, p. 6.

³⁴ M.D. Silber, A. Bhatt, op.cit. p. 11.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 20.

cide³⁶. Aleksandra Gołaś, led by the guidelines of Marek Hamma, concludes that a stay in a penitentiary unit had an impact on people significant for contemporary times. As an example, she gives the figure of the imprisoned Indian philosopher, political and spiritual leader Mahatma Gandhi and the Nobel Peace Prize winner Nelson Mandela, who spent twenty-seven years in prison. The author also cites an extreme example of using time spent in prison to develop destructive philosophies. In the case of Adolf Hitler, a stay in the prison in Landsberg (Justizvollzugsanstalt Landsberg) resulted in writing the work “Mein Kampf”, which meant even more radicalization of his views. As he admitted, “while in prison, I had time to provide my philosophy with natural, historical foundations.”³⁷

Penitentiary units can play a significant role in the functioning of terrorist organizations, because they provide the opportunity to attract participants as well as enable them to be radicalized. As pointed out by Aleksandra Gołaś, the evidence may be the separatist organization Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA), which was established in 1959. The philosophy of the functioning of this structure provided for continuous monitoring of the current members who remain in penitentiary isolation. The lodging of prisoners in prisons located close to the place of residence was a facilitation for ETA leaders, so that all participants of the informal structure stayed in several institutions. The above resulted in group pressure, which was an obstacle for people wanting to break away and withdraw from criminal activity³⁸.

An important factor for the radicalization process is the **identity crisis**. According to the dictionary of psychology, identity is a basic concept in the theory of personality, it means: “constant self, internal, subjective perception of self as an individual”³⁹. The identity crisis, on the other hand, is “the loss of self-identity, the lack of a sense of self-continuity over time, the fact that a person in a given place and time is phenomenologically the same person as yesterday”⁴⁰. The crisis of the identity of young people existing on the border between two cultures carries the risk of turning towards radical Islam⁴¹. As Carl Bjorkman notes, people deprived of their liberty are susceptible to influence, because many of them find themselves in an existential crisis⁴².

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³⁶ M. Hamm, *The Spectacular Few. Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat*, New York and London 2013, pp. 1-18; A. Gołaś, *Factors and determinants of the radicalization of Muslims in prisons. case study of Great Britain [Czynniki i uwarunkowania radykalizacji muzułmanów w zakładach karnych. studium przypadku Wielkiej Brytanii]*, [in:] *E-Politikon*. XXIII, 2017, p. 137.

³⁷ J. Toland, *Hitler. Biographical reportage [Hitler. Reportaż biograficzny]*, Warsaw 2014, p. 231; A. Gołaś, *op.cit.*, 138

³⁸ A. Gołaś, *op.cit.*, p. 138.

³⁹ A.S. Reber, E.S. Reber, *Dictionary of Psychology [Słownik psychologii]*, Warsaw 2008, p. 805.

⁴⁰ A.S. Reber, E.S. Reber, *Dictionary of Psychology [Słownik psychologii]*, Warsaw 2008, p. 804.

⁴¹ I. Veenkamp, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

⁴² C. Bjorkman, C. (2010). *Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism in Italy*, [in:] M. Ranstorp, *Understanding violent radicalisation. terrorist and Jihadist movements in Europe*, London, pp. 231-255.

Quintan Wiktorowicz, on the basis of a case study, discovered that people with superficial religious knowledge are more susceptible to radicalization than those who are well acquainted with Islamic theologies⁴³. Thus, it can be concluded that some residents of penitentiary units, in particular those in crisis, may become victims of ideological activists. Circumstances which increase the risk of radicalization and at the same time reduce the chance of effective rehabilitation is overpopulation of penitentiary units⁴⁴.

Fighting inmates' radicalization

Ivo Veenkamp points to three pillars of counteracting radicalization of behavior in Dutch society. These are: the full integration of Muslims into society, the promotion of anti-radical behavior in Muslim communities, and the identification, isolation and encirclement of radicalization processes in order to stop the transformation of radicalization into violence⁴⁵. Particularly interesting and inspiring from the point of view of the subject of this study seems to be the third pillar. The basic task is to detect signals about people who are isolated from society and those who take action against him. To make this possible, the local community needs to cooperate. Thus, a system was created that allowed – to put it simply – “reporting” about the alleged radicalization. Information goes to special points, which analyze it and develop a further strategy.

The work of the services may involve hidden or open activities, depending on the needs. In the Netherlands, the issue of radicalization of prisoners has been raised for a long time. In 2007, Ivo Veenkamp emphasized that the radicalization of attitudes among prisoners in penitentiary units was given special attention. At that time, Dutch prisons carried out a policy of protection of residents from committed jihad activists. Thus, the latter were sent to two special penitentiary centers, isolating from the remaining prison community. The second important element in the prevention of radicalization in prisons was conducting specialized training of employees performing duties in penitentiary units intended for radical prisoners, in the detection of manifestations of radicalization of moods⁴⁶.

For comparison, it is worth pointing out what actions have already been undertaken in Spanish prisons in 2007 as part of penitentiary policy, which is part of the fight against radicalization. These were primarily: counteracting the grouping of inmates to serve the continuation of terrorist activities, geographical spread of these people, overhearing of telephone conversations of prisoners, giving the

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⁴³ Schmid, A., op.cit., p. 24.

⁴⁴ Point 10. European Parliament Resolution, op. cit.

⁴⁵ I.Veenkamp, op.cit., p. 16.

⁴⁶ I.Veenkamp. op.cit. 16.

opportunity to use religious practices for Muslims, kept by clerics lecturing only “moderate” content⁴⁷.

The European Parliament underlines that the administration of penitentiary units should isolate prisoners who profess violent extremism and are effectively recruited by terrorist organizations. The purpose of the isolation is to prevent other prisoners from becoming more radical through bullying. However, decisions on such proceedings should be made by the court in each individual case. The European Parliament authorized the RAN Commission and the Member States to examine evidence and experience related to the effectiveness of the isolation method in preventing the spread of radicalization in prisons⁴⁸. There is a division among experts regarding the effects of isolating the radicalized prisoners. Nevertheless, everyone agrees about the need to implement a strategy of withdrawal of prisoners from radical actions. This process should start in the penitentiary unit, however, it should be continued in cooperation with the relevant entities after release⁴⁹.

The cooperation of penitentiary units with other sectors

Frank Urbancic points out that the arrest and placement of terrorists in prisons should be one of the main elements of the global fight against terrorist leaders⁵⁰. However, it should be emphasized that the role of penitentiary units in counteracting terrorism is only partial. Placing a terrorist in a penitentiary unit, just like killing him, is just a means of giving time to apply other types of activities⁵¹.

The cooperation of penitentiary institutions with other sectors on the radicalization of persons deprived of liberty concerns, in the opinion of the authors of the article, two basic areas. The first of these is security, the second is social

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⁴⁷ PP Hernandez, Strategy for coordination of anti-terrorist activities, [in:] M. Adamczuk, K. Rypulak-Mirowska, Counteracting terrorism. Coordination of anti-terrorist activities. Materials from the conference [Przeciwdziałanie terroryzmowi. Koordynacja działań antyterrorystycznych. Materiały z konferencji], https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/terroryzm_publik08.pdf, p. 25, (downloaded: 2019-01-07).

⁴⁸ Point 11 European Parliament Resolution, op. cit.

⁴⁹ High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation, op.cit., p. 3.

⁵⁰ F. Urbancic, Strategies and methods of operation of international terrorist groups [in:] M. Adamczuk, K. Rypulak-Mirowska, Counteracting terrorism. Coordination of anti-terrorism actions. Conference materials [Przeciwdziałanie terroryzmowi. Koordynacja działań antyterrorystycznych. Materiały z konferencji] https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/terroryzm_publik08.pdf, s. 48, (downloaded: 2019-01-07).

⁵¹ Ibidem F. Urbancic, Strategies and methods of operation of international terrorist groups [in:] M. Adamczuk, K. Rypulak-Mirowska (red.), Counteracting terrorism. Coordination of anti-terrorism actions. Conference materials [Przeciwdziałanie terroryzmowi. Koordynacja działań antyterrorystycznych. Materiały z konferencji] https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/terroryzm_publik08.pdf, p. 46, (downloaded: 2019-01-07).

rehabilitation and reintegration into society. These areas, from the point of view of the administration of the prison, depend on each other and interact with each other. As Robert Borkowski remarks, “If prevention is understood broadly as the whole of anticipation, counteraction and suppression of the most dangerous types of crime, it is undoubtedly a priority of the internal policy of every civilized state. Scientific research, threat analysis, intelligence cooperation and information exchange as well as surveillance of potentially threatening security environments are nowadays elementary state tasks in the area of anti-terrorist security policy”⁵².

Cooperation between the police, penitentiary units and the system of probation supervision in the subject of extremist and terrorist criminals is of great importance for the management of security and social rehabilitation. This is a key triangle in wider cooperation between different agencies, which also includes other stakeholders, such as prosecutors, local authorities and social workers. Information exchange is the basis for cooperation of interested entities. The cooperation depends on the possibilities that the law gives to the individual institution. The common denominator is the risk assessment performed by the services. However, the tools they use are different. The variety of tools does not necessarily have to be a barrier to cooperation, however mutual knowledge of the tools and the same interpretation of the received data are indispensable⁵³.

An effective exchange of information will only be possible in the case of appropriate policy decisions and the implementation of legislative changes. European Union regulations, interstate solutions and intra-state law decide which information, for what purpose and in what circumstances they can be made available. There are opinions that the ideal situation would be to have all the data at any time by each agency. The lack of realism of this vision, however, results from legal and organizational limitations. For operational and financial reasons, it is not possible to process all data and to select the most-important information from them. The following variables are meaningful: which information can be made available, to whom they can be lent or from whom it can be obtained, under what circumstances information can be exchanged and to what extent it can be used. On the other hand, the issue of recognizing information as important in the prevention of extremism seems difficult due to the multifactorial nature of this phenomenon. Risk estimation or indication of threats is possible after the various information has been confronted with each other⁵⁴. The challenge for countries interested in effective cooperation is therefore to develop appropriate procedures.

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⁵² R. Borkowski, *Radykalizacja jako ...*, op. cit. p. 74.

⁵³ M. Molenkamp, L. Wouterse, *Ex post paper Triple P: Coordination and collaboration between police, prison and probation services in dealing with violent extremist and terrorist offenders*, p. 1. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p_en (downloaded: 2019-01-10).

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

Pedro Perello Hernandez pointed out that the prison system (since the 1980s) is an important element in counteracting terrorism in Spain. In this country, effective prevention in this area was to be based on: “strengthening international cooperation, efficiency of court work, assistance to victims of terrorism, launching new structures, new police activities, prison policy, constant dialogue with Muslim communities and other complementary activities”⁵⁵.

In Denmark, information exchange involving penitentiary service has been in place since 1998. At that time, a cooperation network was organized (KSP prison & probation, police and social services). The prison service in Denmark functions as part of the KSP network, which is an element of the structure under which various agencies cooperate, which enables cooperation in, for example, counteracting extremism or terrorism⁵⁶. As Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen from the University of Southern Denmark points out, since 2012, the staff of penitentiary units and the probation sector have been trained by Danish security services and intelligence in the field of radicalization and extremism. Thanks to this, the staff is equipped with the skills necessary to detect signals indicating a potential hazard in the environment of their work. The staff is also obliged to provide such information to security and intelligence services⁵⁷.

In the Czech Republic, prison services, the police academy and the National Center Against Organized Crime (NCOZ) have jointly developed the SAIRO pilot program. It was recognized that there is a need for cooperation to detect radicalization in the prison environment. The created tool has been adapted to the Czech realities, that is, the aspects related to right-wing and left-wing extremism were taken into account. The program is based on monitoring the behavior of prisoners and analyzing and assessing the information obtained. It also makes it possible to share this information between penitentiary units and appropriate services that take care of the security of the state⁵⁸.

Information exchange between penitentiary units and security services also functions in Germany. However, the impact is put on the restrictions resulting from the EU Directive 2016/680⁵⁹ concerning, among other things, the processing of personal data by competent authorities to prevent crimes. An important element is the requirement to disclose data exchange with security authorities, which means that cooperation in this area will take place under greater rigor.

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⁵⁵ P.P. Hernandez, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

⁵⁶ M. Molenkamp, L. Wouterse, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

⁵⁷ A. S. Hemmingsen, *The Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization*, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen 2015, p. 30

⁵⁸ M. Molenkamp, L. Wouterse, *op.cit.*, pp. 5-6.

⁵⁹ Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU)2016/680 on 2016-04-27 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of crime prevention, prosecution, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses and the enforcement of such criminal offenses, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/WSiSW

Also in German law there are four principles affecting for the exchange of information. This is the principle of the purposefulness of collecting, processing and use of data. This rule prevents automatic data transfer. Information obtained for a specific need may be used in new circumstances of the same rank and made available in justified cases, which is the second principle. Another rule touches on the problem of non-compliance of observation which is long-lasting and covers every human movement with human rights. The last principle is that the exchange of information must serve a particularly important public interest. In fact, however, information exchange comes quite easy, but not automatically. It is also important to be able to recognize prisoners' real security threats so that inadequate procedures are not initiated⁶⁰.

As Damian Szlachter points out, one of the pillars of effective counter-terrorism actions of a given state is having intelligence agents inside a radical extremist organization whose task is to obtain advance information⁶¹. In the context of penitentiary units, at least in the Polish prison reality, preventive actions are possible only in the case of proper identification of the prisoner's environment carried out as part of precautionary activities. According to the analysis of the experience of other countries, the information gained during these activities may be useful also for other services.

Personal security in Polish penitentiary units

Security concerns many dimensions of reality. Based on the elementary, dictionary meaning of the term, security can be defined as a state of non-threat, and in the context of the functioning of the state, it is "all conditions and institutions protecting the state and citizens"⁶². Security depending on the context can be differently defined. Etymologically, the term security (*sine cura*) means a state free of fear. It concerns disposition of knowledge and trust in the predictability of events in the future, confirming the objective order of social life⁶³. Janusz Świniarski notes that one of the possible divisions of security is the distinction of personal safety and structural security. The safety of prisoners staying in penitentiary units

⁶⁰ M. Molenkamp, L. Wouterse, *op.cit.*, p. 2-3.

⁶¹ D. Szlachter, The role of special services and the army in combating terrorism [Rola służb specjalnych i wojska w zwalczaniu terroryzmu], [in:] M. Adamczuk, K. Rypulak-Mirowska, Counteracting terrorism. Coordination of anti-terrorism actions. Conference materials [Przeciwdziałanie terroryzmowi. Koordynacja działań antyterrorystycznych. Materiały z konferencji] https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/terroryzm_publik08.pdf, p. 46, (downloaded: 2019-01-07).

⁶² Dictionary of the Polish language edited by W. Doroszewski, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/slowniki/bezpiecze%C5%84stwo.html>. (access: 2018-12-31).

⁶³ J. Maciejewski, Groups in disposal. Sociological analysis. [Grupy dyspozycyjne. Analiza socjologiczna], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2014, p. 205.

can be understood in the category of personnel and structural security. In this approach, it is presented by the authors of the article. Structural security is both an ambiguous and a somewhat “vague” concept, as well as a concept that often means different phenomena of different “polarities”.

In 1993 Ryszard Rosa pointed to phenomena that were termed “personal safety” (“security of the person”) and “structural security” (“security of social structures”), where “social structures” are identified with “social institutions”⁶⁴. As Jan Maciejewski points out, personal safety is about providing a person with such conditions of existence that will enable him to achieve his own fulfillment. The structural security concerns the institutional and organizational aspect of social life in various dimensions (international, regional, state and local). The essence of structural security is to direct the activities of the institution in a way to ensure personal safety.

In the context of the topic of the study, it is worth emphasizing the unique role in ensuring structural, and thus personal security of the disposable groups⁶⁵. One of them is the Prison Service⁶⁶. The structure that closely cooperates with the Prison Service is the probation service, which also affects the sense of safety of those under their care. Witold Mazurek in the book “Guardian in shaping the safety of children and youth” proposes the introduction of the concept of “safety of children and youth”, which he describes as: “Safe state of existence of children and young people in the time and space of nature and culture, and in all social circles, enabling to satisfy their various life needs and comprehensive personality development, provided to them by all social structures by protecting and defending both life and health and property and dignity of children and adolescents from the prenatal period, as well as all the rights of the child, which is guaranteed by the interpretation of the law, against any possible threats to this state of existence.”⁶⁷

Referring to the above definition and considering the issue of this study, the authors propose the introduction of the term “security of prisoners in penitentiary units”, which they define as: “Safe state of existence of prisoners in penitentiary units enabling them to meet their various life needs, provided to them by the structures of the Prison Service and entities cooperating with the Service, protecting and defending both life and health and property and dignity of prisoners during a stay in a penitentiary unit, which is guaranteed the interpretation of the law, against all possible threats to this state of existence.” The definition limits the range of the Prison Service’s influence to the spacetime, which consists of a penitentiary unit and the period of stay of the inmate in it.

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⁶⁴ R.Rosa, Philosophy of personal and structural security [Filozofia bezpieczeństwa personalnego i strukturalnego], Warsaw 1993.

⁶⁵ O. Nowaczyk, J. Maciejewski, Groups in disposal for the Polish society [Grupy dyspozycyjne społeczeństwa polskiego], Wrocław 2006, p. 78.

⁶⁶ J. Maciejewski, op.cit., p. 141.

⁶⁷ W.Mazurek, Guardianship in shaping the safety conditions for children and adolescents [Kuratela sądowa w kształtowaniu warunków bezpieczeństwa dzieci i młodzieży], Krakow 2014, p. 55

The definition takes into account the structural aspect, that is, it indicates the Prison Service as a structure responsible for the safety of prisoners. However, the definition also includes the phrase “and entities cooperating with it”, which means an indication of a number of institutions (including courts, prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, probation service) that work with the Prison Service in various areas, including in the area of prisoners’ security. The above indicates that the Prison Service in Poland is not and cannot be alone in ensuring the safety of prisoners, which is important in the context of the adoption of radical attitudes by inmates. The safety of prisoners is included as a state and as a process, thus emphasizing the need for constant efforts to ensure security. Each new circumstance, often easy to be underestimated, may have a modifying effect on the decisions of persons responsible for the safety of prisoners in prison units and imply a number of activities, often requiring immediate implementation. Thus, preventive activities have a special place in the process of providing prisoners with security.

Prison Service in the „security“ service.

The Prison Service in Poland implements, among others, the following tasks, formulated in the Act on the Prison Service:

- „ensuring order and security in prisons and detention centers (...)
- conducting penitentiary and rehabilitation interventions for persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty”⁶⁸.

The Prison Service prevents the occurrence of events that pose a threat to security. In accordance with applicable regulations, such events include, among others: assault on an organizational unit, assault on convoy of the Prison Service, hostage taking, rebellion, violation of order, escape of an inmate from the organizational unit, suicide of the detainee, assault on an officer or employee, rape of a prisoner, abuse of prisoners, brawl, beatings, collective illness of prisoners or disclosure of a prohibited item in the organizational unit or place of employment of prisoners outside the organizational unit⁶⁹.

The personal safety of prisoners is provided in various dimensions. The protection of a penitentiary unit is carried out by personnel through the use of: “protective measures, preventive actions and security activities”⁷⁰. One of the basic elements related to the provision of personal security is to conduct a perso-

⁶⁸ Article 2.2 point 1,2,6 of the Act of 9 April 2010 on the Prison Service (Journal of Laws of 2010 No. 79, item 523).

⁶⁹ Annex No. 1 to Regulation No. 1/2018 of the General Director of the Prison Service of January 3, 2018 regarding the duty service in the organizational units of the Prison Service, events that may occur in the Prison Service and how to explain and document them.

⁷⁰ § 3 of the Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 17/10/2016 on the ways to protect the organizational units of the Prison Service (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 1804).

nal reconnaissance among prisoners⁷¹. Implementation of the diagnosis as part of preventive activities is the basis for the identification of prisoners exhibiting radical attitudes. Officers and employees implement the so-called preventive activities aimed at “identifying the prisoners’ environment and their intentions that undermine order and security”⁷². Accurate diagnosis is a difficult task, and at the same time it is necessary to ensure personal safety in prisons. In accordance with applicable regulations, recognition is carried out in particular through: “observing behaviors and relationships in the environment of prisoners, recognizing the structures of criminal subculture and identifying the atmosphere and mood among prisoners and their intentions that harm the individual’s safety”⁷³.

Effective diagnosis is conditioned by the professional approach of the staff to the implementation of preventive activities, including knowledge of the process of obtaining information and knowledge about the issue that is being researched⁷⁴.

Inmates’ radicalization – challenge/threat to security in the Polish penitentiary units?

Unfortunately, it is easier to point to places where radicalization can take place. As has been discovered, one of the “incubators of radicalization” is undoubtedly a penitentiary unit. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt note that it is more difficult to determine who can attempt to make others subject to radicalization, as well as who can become a potential victim of it⁷⁵. Below, the authors focused on three issues that in the context of radicalization of prisoners’ attitudes constitute a challenge for penitentiary units, namely: qualifying prisoners as the so-called “Dangerous”, improving the competences of the staff and cooperation with other sectors.

The issues of security and social rehabilitation are regulated, among others, in the Executive Penal Code (KKW). The key elements in dealing with prisoners is to place prisoners in cells and classify them. Thus, it is pointed out that, according to KKW, placing the prisoners in a residential cell includes the following:

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⁷¹ W. Pływaczewski, J. Pomiankiewicz, Prisons as an element of the internal security system of the state – a Polish variant and international aspects [Więziennictwo jako element systemu bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa – wariant polski i aspekty międzynarodowe]. „Przegląd Więziennictwa Polskiego” 2015, no. 82, p. 98.

⁷² § 33 of the Decree of the Minister of Justice of 17/10/2016, op.cit.

⁷³ Ibidem, § 33.

⁷⁴ G. Fuchs, Expert’s intuition and environmental recognition of prisoners by Prison Service officers [Intuicja ekspercka i rozpoznawanie środowiska osadzonych przez funkcjonariuszy Służby Więziennej], [in:] J. Maciejewski, D. Hofman, A. Sokołowska „Cooperation of local government and disposable groups in ensuring the security of local communities” [„Współpraca samorządu terytorialnego oraz grup dyspozycyjnych w zapewnianiu bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych”], Wrocław 2017.

⁷⁵ M.D. Silber, A. Bhatt, op.cit., p. 20;

preventing mutual demoralization, separating the prisoner from detainee arrest, ensuring order and security, shaping the right atmosphere among prisoners, preventing self-aggression and committing crimes during serving sentences as well as providing medical, psychological and rehabilitation recommendations and classification decisions in the case of convicts⁷⁶.

Classification of convicts is carried out “in order to create conditions conducive to individual treatment of convicts, preventing detrimental influences of demoralized convicts and providing convicts with personal security, choosing the right system of punishment, category and type of prison and placing convicts inside the prison⁷⁷.

Code regulations enable effective isolation of an inmate creating a serious social threat or a serious threat to the safety of a penitentiary unit from other prisoners. The first set of reasons for the qualification of the detainee in the above category is in the case of convicts committing a crime, and in the case of detainees suspected of committing a crime “with a very high degree of social harmfulness, in particular crimes of:

- assassination on independence or integrity of the Republic of Poland, constitutional system of the state or constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland, life of the President of the Republic of Poland, unit of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland,
- with particular cruelty,
- taking or holding a hostage or participation in taking a hostage,
- abduction of a ship or aircraft,
- with the use of firearms, explosives or flammable materials⁷⁸.

The second set of premises concerns the behavior of the detainee, who can be classified in this category if “during previous or current deprivation of liberty the person posed a threat to the security of the prison or detention center in such a way that the person:

- was an organizer or active participant in a collective incident in a prison or remand center,
- committed an active assault on a public official or other person employed in a prison or remand center,
- was the perpetrator of rape, serious health damage or mistreatment of a convict, punished or temporarily arrested,

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⁷⁶ Articles 110§4 and 212a § 1 of the Act of June 6, 1997 – Executive Penal Code, (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 90, item 557).

⁷⁷ Article 82 § 1 Acts of June 6, 1997 – Executive Penal Code, (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 90, item 557).

⁷⁸ Art. 88a§1 item 1, 212a 1 of the Act of June 6, 1997 – Executive Penal Code, (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 90, item 557).

— freed himself or attempted to free himself from a closed penitentiary facility or detention center, or while being escorted outside a prison or detention center”⁷⁹.

The third circumstance is committing or suspicion of a crime in an organized group or relationship aimed at committing crimes, especially because of its managerial or significant role in a group or relationship⁸⁰.

The classification of an inmate posing a serious social threat or a serious threat to the safety of a penitentiary unit from the rest of the prisoners imprisoned by the Penitentiary Commission is of course the first step. The provisions strictly regulate the treatment of such persons at a later stage of their stay in penitentiary isolation.

In conclusion, one of the methods of preventing negative influences of radical prisoners from others is to isolate them. It should be pointed out that classification of the detainee in accordance with the above guidelines implies a series of protective measures, which makes it possible to effectively isolate and ensure safety. However, it is not the only option for isolation. The prison service has a number of possibilities for both accommodation of prisoners, individually or with other appropriately selected prisoners or allowing such contact even during walks. The essence is the proper identification of threats and adaptation to them, taking into account the rights of the detained activities. Nevertheless, returning to the qualification of the prisoner as posing a serious social threat, or a serious threat to the safety of the prison, it is worth pointing out that there are no reasons for such qualification for a person affecting the radicalization of other prisoners.

There are indications that a suspect may be qualified, for example, for committing a crime of high degree of harmfulness with a significant cruelty, taking a hostage, using firearms, explosives or flammable or participating in an organized criminal group. Intuitively, it can be assumed that radical criminals should be sought, *inter alia*, among persons committing such crimes. Also in the second set regarding the behavior of prisoners during their stay in prison isolation, there is a record directly allowing the qualification of the prisoner to the discussed category, who were the organizers or active participants of the collective incident. Undoubtedly, also in this case, intuition suggests that among these people one should also look for radicalized prisoners.

However, bearing in mind the experience of other European Union countries, as well as the experience of authors acquired in the penitentiary service and in the area of state security, it becomes possible to say that prisoners who tend to have a negative influence on other prisoners by inspiring attitudes and radical be-

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⁷⁹ Art. 88a§1 item 2, 212a 1 of the Act of June 6, 1997 – Executive Penal Code, (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 90, item 557).

⁸⁰ Art. 88a§1 item 3, 212a 1 of the Act of June 6, 1997 – Executive Penal Code, (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 90, item 557).

haviors (both in during their stay in isolation and after being released), they did not in any case commit offenses listed above or were organizers or participants in collective rebellions. M.E. Loftus rightly notes that criminals like predatory animals “go hunting” when the victim does not expect it. In addition, in many cases, criminals are able to disrupt the perception of their victim as they are skilled in the art of manipulation.⁸¹

Thus, it is pointed out that the cunning of activists who are supposed to radicalize other inmates may rely on not revealing their beliefs. The threats posed by the spread of extremist ideologies (in the conditions of Polish penitentiary units not necessarily exclusively related to Islam, but rather to right-wing and left-wing extremism), may concern both the security of the penitentiary unit and society. In view of the above, the authors propose that the creation of the possibility of qualifying prisoners who have been proven to spread this type of ideology in prison as the so-called “Dangerous”. Qualification would be possible if radical behaviors were added to the second set of premises. The qualification procedure would require, among other things, specifying the detailed conditions that the detainee would have to meet, as well as who and in what circumstances he could make such a decision.


As emphasized in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of the diagnosis depends on the knowledge, skills and competences of the prison staff. Recognition of the prisoners’ environment, in the context of detecting attitudes and radical behaviors, is undoubtedly a difficult task. In connection with the above, it is worth paying attention to the emerging need to train penitentiary staff in the field of:

- development of intercultural competences,
- recognition of the symptoms of radicalization and understanding of this process, in the context of the phenomenon of security.

It is worth pointing out that intercultural competences are primarily: the ability to communicate in foreign languages, understanding the behavior of culturally different people, especially in terms of understanding language and cultural codes. An important element is also the insight into their own culture, history and tradition, as well as its impact on social communication⁸². The high level of intercultural competence results in better efficiency in institutional arrangements as well as in informal interpersonal relations. Individuals with a high level of intercultural competence are able to adapt quickly to the conditions of social re-

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⁸¹ M. E. Loftus, Developing intuition to detect criminal minds. <http://www.crime-safety-security.com/criminal-minds-intuition.html> (downloaded: 2018-04-09).

⁸² A. Chańko, Education of intercultural competences of the staff of penitentiary institutions in Poland – the context of work with foreigners in prison isolation [Kształcenie kompetencji międzykulturowych kadry instytucji penitencjarnych w Polsce – kontekst pracy z obcokrajowcami przebywającymi w izolacji więziennej] in: red. P. Barczyk, A. Barczyk, Psychological and therapeutic context of environmental work [Psychologiczny i terapeutyczny kontekst pracy środowiskowej]. Myslowice 2010, p. 175.



Drawing 1. Development of intercultural sensitivity

Source: Monika Chutnik, *Szok kulturowy. Przyczyny, konsekwencje, przeciwdziałanie*. Kraków 2007, s. 121; Bennett Milton J., *A Developmental Approach to Training Intercultural Sensitivity*, „International Journal of Intercultural Relations”, nr 10(2), s. 182.

lations, even if they do not know them. They are able to perform tasks in such conditions and realize the set goals⁸³.

There are many models of intercultural competence. Models were created for people who settled in other countries. From the point of view of the needs of penitentiary units, an interesting proposal is the model of Milton Bennett DMIS (Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity), depicted in the drawing 1.

The model should be treated as a way of individual development, which allows predicting its behavior and making of the development plan. Ethnocentric phases (the experience of one’s culture as the center of reality) is denial, defense and minimization.

Denial is the negation of differences between cultures, recognition of one’s own culture as the only true one. This is accompanied by isolation from other cultures and aggressive reactions towards a foreign culture. The defense phase differs in that the individual is aware of cultural differences that one is experiencing as a threat. The phase of minimizing cultural difference involves experiencing fragments of one’s own culture as universal. The next three, i.e. acceptance, adaptation and integration are ethnocentric phases (own culture experienced in the context of other cultures). The stage of acceptance of cultural differences allows

⁸³ Monika Chutnik, *Culture shock. Causes, consequences, counteracting* [Szok kulturowy. Przyczyny, konsekwencje, przeciwdziałanie]. Kraków 2007, p. 114.

the individual's culture to survive as one of many worldviews. Adaptation allows to experience specific situations from the perspectives of cultures other than your own. Then, to better communicate with people of different cultures, the unit expands the range of one's own behavior. The stage of integration enables a man to combine the points of view of individual cultures into one system⁸⁴.

In terms of identifying the symptoms of radicalization and understanding of this process, it seems appropriate to continue the active participation of representatives of the Prison Service in international trainings, as well as conducting own training at the national level, in accordance with the examples cited in the article. Extremely useful would be knowledge about radicalization remaining at the disposal of other services dealing with radicalization and counteracting terrorism.

As Marcin Krzywicki points out, the number of challenges for the safety of penitentiary units is constantly growing, and methods that have remained unchanged for a long time may turn out to be insufficient. Information gained in the penitentiary unit can increase the level of security in society, including being useful for counteracting crime and terrorism⁸⁵. Thus, the authors of this article call for consideration to strengthen the cooperation of the Prison Service with the law enforcement authorities in the exchange of information on counteracting radicalization. Examples of good practices in Western European countries, presented earlier, are encouraging. It also seems important to adapt the understanding and approach to radicalization in penitentiary units to Polish realities. The prison reality of the Polish state is closer to the Czech Republic than to the Netherlands, Denmark or Germany. However, it is worth emphasizing that it has a number of conditions, specific to Poland only.

Summary

The article provides a rough analysis of the issues of personal security in penitentiary units in the context of the radicalization of prisoners. The intention of the authors was the usefulness of the content and signaling that the issue requires further scientific exploration as well as the attention of practitioners responsible for the safety of prisoners staying in Polish penitentiary units. Perhaps it is worth considering to deepen the cooperation of penitentiary units with other services in

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⁸⁴ Monika Chutnik, Culture shock. Causes, consequences, counteracting [Szok kulturowy. Przyczyny, konsekwencje, przeciwdziałanie]. Kraków 2007, pp. 120-122; Bennett Milton J., A Developmental Approach to Training Intercultural Sensitivity, "International Journal of Intercultural Relations", no. 10(2), p. 182.

⁸⁵ M. Krzywicki, Theoretical basics of detecting the criminal environment of prisoners [Podstawy teoretyczne rozpoznania kryminalnego środowiska osób osadzonych], [in:] M. Kozielska, Scientific-methodical review education for safety [Przegląd naukowo-metodyczny edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa], 3/2017 (36), Poznan p. 87.

the field of counteracting the radicalization of prisoners. Thus, the knowledge of prison staff gained during preventive activities may be valuable for some services. An important element observed by the European agencies is the training of prison staff at international and national level, exchange of effective practices and experiences. The third element, which the authors have particularly noticed, is the issue of effective isolation of prisoners who are the source of the threat. The article indicates the necessity to start legislative work that will lead to legal possibilities to increase the range of activities that the Prison Service could undertake in seeking to prevent the spread of radical attitudes among prisoners detained in penitentiary isolation.

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